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Abstract 
 
In this study, we examine the relationship between the U.S. real price of oil and factors that 
affect its movement over time: futures prices, the value of the dollar, exploration, demand, and 
supply.  All of these variables are treated as jointly endogenous and a reduced form vector error 
correction model, testing for cointegration amongst the variables, is estimated.  We find that for 
model specifications with short-term futures contracts, supply does indeed dominate price 
movements in the crude oil market.  However, for specifications including longer-term contracts 
that are inherently more speculative, the real price of oil appears to be determined predominantly 
by the futures price.  Moreover, there is empirical evidence of hoarding in the crude oil market: 
both oil stocks/inventories and futures prices are found to be positively cointegrated/correlated 
with each other.  From a policy perspective, the results of this analysis indicate that if regulators 
really wanted to limit speculation in the oil market, it should keep the shorter-term futures 
contracts and eliminate the more speculative six months futures contracts.      
 
JEL Codes:  C32, G00, Q41 
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Introduction  
There are those who believe high oil prices are the result of market forces--limited supply 
meets endless demand, which makes barrels of crude more expensive.  In an October 2004 
National Review article, “The Oil Bubble: Set to Burst?” it was argued that oil prices, at that 
time $62 a barrel, would soon collapse.  In ten months, oil was $73 a barrel.1  All through oil’s 
five-year price surge, rising to $105 per barrel as of March 2008, there have been many voices 
asserting that the precipitous rise is all the result of speculation--unsupported by the rudiments of 
supply and demand.2  Speculation will increase oil prices through hoarding or increasing private 
inventories of crude.  Some espouse that inventories have remained at “normal” levels, which 
implies that the rise in oil prices is not the result of runaway speculation, but the consequence of 
decreasing supply and the rapid growth of developing economies like China and India.3  We 
would like to point out that the notion of high futures prices reducing physical supplies through 
“hoarding” has nothing to do with a “normal” level of inventories, but whether there exists a 
positive relationship between futures prices and oil stocks/inventories.  
In this study, the relationship between the price of oil and factors that affect its movement 
over time: futures prices, the value of the dollar, exploration, world demand, and world supply, 
will be examined.  We will treat all of these variables as jointly endogenous and estimate a 
reduced form VEC model, testing for cointegration amongst the variables.  The advantage to 
using this approach is twofold: first, the statistical results we get are not subject to endogeneity 
 
1   Spot Price of WTI/Light Crude as traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange for delivery in Cushing, 
Oklahoma. 
2   Ibid. 
3   Paul Krugman, The Oil Nonbubble, The New York Times Opinion, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/12/opinion/12krugman.html?_r=2&th&emc=th&oref=sl&oref=slogin 
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bias, since the models used have only predetermined or exogenous variables on the right-hand 
side.  Second, given that we will test for cointegrating relationships, there is little concern about 
finding “spurious” associations among the variables that may exist when one simply correlates 
two or more random walks with each other (Enders (2004)).  Our fundamental purpose will be to 
determine just how much influence futures prices/speculation has on the real spot price of oil in 
the long-run. 
Theory 
 Commodity-index investing has increased to $260 billion in 2008 from $13 billion in 
2003.  The prices of the 25 commodities that make up key market indexes have increased by an 
average of 183 percent in the same period.4  Index-fund investors do not buy physical 
commodities--they trade in futures contracts which are agreements to buy or sell a specific 
amount of a commodity at a set price by a specific date.5  Thus, futures are benchmarks for 
prices across commodities markets.6  An oil refiner may use futures to ensure up a quantity of oil 
for delivery at a later date or a farmer may use them to guarantee a price for his crop, but an 
index fund investor is only interested in riding a price trend by trading in contracts.7  These 
investors in the fund are not financing new oil wells that could boost global crude supplies—they 
are just reaping price gains in the commodity markets.8  Crude oil was at $54 per barrel in 
 
4   http://www.latimes.com/business/la‐fi‐petruno24‐2008may24,1,6762856.column. 
5   Ibid. 
6   Ibid. 
7   Ibid. 
8   Ibid. 
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January 2007, $72 in August 2007, and $105 in March 2008.9  Many believe that oil prices are 
set based upon rumor, greed, and the fear of world interruptions—all having little to do with 
physical supply and demand. 
What about the argument that oil price fluctuations are predominantly due to changes in 
demand and supply?  Since early 2007, the U.S. demand for petroleum has fallen by one (1) 
percent and world demand has risen by 1.3 percent.  Testifying to a U.S. Congressional 
Committee, Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA) has stated that world supplies are 
up and world oil production will increase significantly over the next seven years.10  Moreover, an 
analysis of global oil production and development demonstrates that the world is not running out 
of oil in the near-term, and a large increase in the availability of unconventional oils will expand 
global liquid hydrocarbons capacity by as much as one-fourth in the next ten years.11  Oil has 
always been produced under conditions of imperfect competition.  From the late nineteenth 
century days of John D. Rockefeller and the Standard Oil monopoly to the emergence of the 
“Seven Sisters” oligopoly--encompassing Standard Oil, Shell, BP, Texaco, Mobil, Gulf and 
Socal, to the rise of OPEC representing the major producing countries, the notion of a “free 
market” in the production of oil has been a delusion.  One could argue that the predominant 
determinant of price has shifted from OPEC (having only 40% of the world production) and the 
oil companies to the speculators in the commodities markets.  What transpires in the unregulated 
New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), without the Commodity Futures Trading 
 
9   Spot Price of WTI/Light Crude as traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange for delivery in Cushing, 
Oklahoma. 
10   http://www.finfacts.com/irelandbusinessnews/publish/article_10004190.shtml. 
11   Ibid. 
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Commission (CFTC) enforced margin requirements, may be the source of increasing oil prices.  
Thus, the current market price may not be based solely upon physical supply and demand. 
Alternatively, Krugman (2008) and other economists believe that there is no such thing as 
an “oil bubble.”  He considers a scenario in which supply and demand balanced at a price of $25 
per barrel, and speculation drove the price up to $100.  What would occur?  Drivers would cut 
back on driving, homeowners would turn down their thermostats, and owners of marginal oil 
wells would put them back into production.  As a result, the balance between supply and demand 
would be replaced with a situation in which supply exceeded demand.  This excess supply would 
drive prices back down--unless the excess was taken off the market.  Thus, the only way 
speculation can increase oil prices is through hoarding.  Krugman (2008) does not believe that 
speculation is prevalent in the market.  He maintains that all through the period of the alleged 
bubble, inventories have remained at more or less normal levels.  Therefore, the rise in oil prices 
is not the result of runaway speculation but rather the result of fundamental factors like the 
difficulty of finding oil and the rapid growth of emerging economies like China.  As mentioned 
previously, the problem we have with this approach is the fact that the idea of speculation and 
high futures prices reducing physical supplies through “hoarding” has nothing really to do with 
what is considered “normal” inventories, but whether increases/decreases in futures prices are 
associated with increases/decreases in oil stocks or inventories.  
As mentioned previously, our purpose here will be to determine just how much of an 
influence speculation has had on the market price of oil.  The time period used is from January 
1988 to March 2008.  The following variables will be utilized in this analysis,12 
 
12     See Appendix I for a complete description. 
• tPOIL  - Crude Oil Spot Price at Cushing, Oklahoma (adjusted for inflation 
using the Personal Consumption Expenditure Chain Price Index), 
 
• itFPOIL  - Two, Three, Four, and Six Months Futures Price of Light, Sweet 
Crude Oil ( 2,3,4,6 ), i =
 
• tEX  - Real Trade Weighted Exchange Value of Dollar versus Major 
Currencies, 
 
• tWELLS  - Total Oil from New U.S. Wells, 
 
• tDOIL  - World Oil Demand, 
 
• tSOIL  - World Oil Supply, and 
 
• tIRAQ  - a Dummy Variable Indicating the Time Periods of the Gulf War and 
the Iraq War. 
 
Time plots of the continuous variables may be found in Figure 1.  All variables (except the 
dummy) are expressed in natural logarithmic units, so the estimated coefficients are interpreted 
as elasticities.  The price of petroleum is generally measured as the spot price of either 
WTI/Light Crude, traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) for delivery in 
Cushing, Oklahoma or the price of Brent as traded on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE, into 
which the International Petroleum Exchange has been incorporated) for delivery at Sullom Voe.  
We decided to use the Spot Price at Cushing, Oklahoma, since it has historically been more of a 
U.S. crude oil “basket.”  Not only is it used as the basis for U.S.-traded oil futures, but it's also a 
key benchmark for U.S. production.  The two, three, four, and six month’s contract settlement 
prices are the futures prices.  The dummy variable is used in an attempt to capture periods in 
which there were supply interruptions, e.g., Iraq’s oil production is 900,000 barrels per day 
below prewar levels.  Inclusion of this variable may be considered to be somewhat controversial, 
as one can identify many such “structural changes” over the past ten or so years.  While this is 
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case, we decided to include just the periods of the Gulf and Iraq wars since these are probably 
the most mentioned regarding their effects on the price of crude.  
[ Insert Figure 1 Here ] 
 We begin by specifying four separate reduced-form Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model 
using the above jointly endogenous variables, 
     1 1 2 2 ....it i it i it ip it p itX A X A X A X ε− − −= + + + +K K K K K ,     (1) 
where, 
  
( , , , , , , ) ,  2,3,4,6,
 - 7 x 7 matrix of coefficients, 2,3,4,6, 1,2,..., ,  and
 - 7 x 1 vector of random errors with variance-covariance matrix .
it t t t t t t t
ij
it
X POIL FPOILi EX WELLS DOIL SOIL IRAQ i
A i j p
εε
′ ′= =
= =
Σ
K
K
Using a simple transformation, the VAR in equation (1) can be rewritten in terms of first 
differences, creating a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model, 
 
1
1
1
p
it i it i it itX X Xϖ ϖ
ϖ
π π−− −
=
Δ = + Δ +∑K K K εK        (2) 
Alternatively, we can consider a VEC model with a deterministic term.  The deterministic term, 
, can contain a constant, a linear trend, seasonal dummy variables, or nonstochastic 
regressors,   
tD
1
1
1
p
it i it i it t it
i i i
X X X ADϖ ϖ
ϖ
π π ε
π α β
−
− −
=
Δ = + Δ + +
′=
∑K K K K .      (3) 
Since the data is monthly and has not been seasonally adjusted,  will contain monthly 
seasonal dummy variables.   
tD
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 If the matrix has a full rank (r = 7), all components of tX
K
 are I(0) (stationary or 
integrated of order zero).  On the other hand, tX
K
 are stationary in first differences if the 
( ) 0irank π =
i it
.  If the rank of the matrix is r < 7, there are (7 – r) linear combinations that are 
nonstationary and r stationary cointegrating relations.  Note that the linearly independent vector, 
Xβ ′ K , is stationary and this transformation is not unique unless r = 1.  β  is the matrix of 
cointegrating parameters and α  is the matrix of weights with which each cointegrating vector 
enters the six equations of the VEC.  α can also be considered as the matrix of the speed of 
adjustment parameters.   
Our interest lies with the unique case where r = 1.  itXβ ′ K  may be written as, 
  (4) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8it i i t i it i t i t i t i t i tPOIL FPOIL EX WELLS DOIL SOIL IRAQν β β β β β β β β= + + + + + + +
One motivation for the VEC form is to consider i itXν β ′= K  as defining the underlying economic 
relations and assume that the agents react to the disequilibrium error iν through the adjustment 
coefficient iα to restore equilibrium ( 0iν = ); that is, they satisfy the economic relations.  The 
econometric use of the term “equilibrium” is any long-run relationship among nonstationary 
variables.  Cointegration does not require that the long-run relationship be generated by market 
forces or by the behavioral rules of individuals.  In Engle and Granger’s (1987) use of the term, 
the equilibrium relationship may be causal, behavioral, or simply a reduced form relationship 
among similarly trending variables (Enders (2004)).  The cointegrating vector, iβ , is sometimes 
referred to as the vector of long-run parameters.  We can also normalize equation (4) with 
respect to 2iβ , 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 2
            
t i i it i t i t i t i t i t
ij it
ij it
i i
POIL FPOIL EX WELLS DOIL SOIL IRAQ itθ θ θ θ θ θ θ
β νθ ηβ β
= + + + + + + +
= − = −
η
  (5) 
Since all of the variables are in natural logarithmic units, the ijθ and their estimates are elasticity 
coefficients and may be interpreted as the percentage change in the price of oil given a one 
percent change in the relevant explanatory variable, ceteris paribus.  Moreover, the magnitude of 
the elasticities will tell us which variables have had the largest effect on the price of crude over 
this period. 
Results 
 We first test each variable for the presence of a unit root using the more efficient Dickey 
Fuller Test with GLS Detrending (Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996)).  The results are in 
Table I.  The null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for each and it appears that the 
variables are all integrated of order one (I(1)). 
[ Insert Table I Here ]    
As noted above, there are four futures price variables: two months, three months, four 
months, and six months contracts.  This means that there are four models estimated using each 
futures price variable ( ).  We determined the lag length, p, by fitting the VAR 
equation (1) for each model and using the lag length criteria test in Eviews 6.0.
2,3,4,6i =
13  The lag length 
tests were performed using the likelihood ratio test statistic recommended by Sims (1980).14  
Following this, the Johansen procedure (Johansen (1988)) was used to test for cointegration and 
the results may be found in Table II.  It is interesting to note that the null hypothesis of r = 0 is 
                                                            
13   EViews 6.0 was the software that was used for this entire analysis. 
14   See Enders (2004), page 363 for a complete explanation of the procedure.  For reasons of brevity, the 
results will be made available upon request from the authors. 
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rejected in favor of the alternative that r = 1 in each case.  However, in the models with the 
shorter two and three months contracts, there is some ambiguity regarding the number of 
cointegrating relationships at .05α = (r = 3 and r = 2, respectively), albeit the null hypothesis 
that r = 0 is rejected in each case at .01α = .  When there are multiple cointegrating vectors, it is 
not straightforward to interpret their meaning, since you have to know what restrictions should 
be imposed on the system.  Given the rejection of the null hypothesis that r = 0 in each case at 
the .01 level, we shall proceed to estimate the VEC equation (3) and equation (5) for each futures 
price. 
[ Insert Table II Here ] 
 The estimation results for equation (5) are in Table III.  Since our predominant interest 
lies with the cointegrating relation, for reasons of brevity, the estimates of the entire VEC model 
are not presented here.15  The initial most noteworthy result is the increasing magnitude and 
statistical significance of the futures price coefficients for each of the equations in Table III, 
      Coefficient  
• Two Months Contract:          .920 
• Three Months Contract:    1.100 
• Four Months Contract:      1.186 
• Six Months Contract:        1.565 
 
A one percent increase in the shorter-term two and three-months contracts is associated with a 
close to one percent increase in the real price of crude—a proportionate or unitary elastic 
response.  However, a one percent increase in the six-months contract futures price is associated 
with a 1.6 percent increase in the real price of oil—a more than proportionate or elastic response.  
What is even more interesting is the magnitude of the coefficients of the remaining variables as 
                                                            
15   The estimation results of the VEC model will be made available upon request from the authors. 
11 
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the contract length increases.  For example, in the equations for the two, three, and four months 
contracts futures prices, the predominant variable in terms of its effect on the real price of oil is 
world supply, 
      Coefficient on Supply Variable 
• Two Months Contract:     -3.180 
• Three Months Contract:   -2.094  
• Four Months Contract:     -1.916 
Thus, for these shorter-term futures prices, one could argue that “the economic data show that oil 
price levels are being driven by powerful fundamental economic forces and the laws of supply 
and demand," not by speculation.16  Changes in shorter-term futures prices are not unimportant 
in predicting oil prices levels but changes in supply have a larger effect on real oil prices.17 
[ Insert Table III Here ] 
 However, the situation is different for the six months contract futures price.  Not only is 
the coefficient on the six-months futures price elastic and statistically significant, but it is the 
only statistically significant variable (other than the Iraq war dummy variable) in the equation.  
In one sense, this is not a surprising finding given that fact that a six months futures contract 
would be inherently more speculative than the shorter contract periods.  Therefore, the six 
months futures price, not supply nor demand, appears to be driving the real price of oil in the 
market, ceteris paribus.  These results imply that if the six months futures price were to fall by 
twenty percent, the real price of crude would decline by more than thirty percent from its 
present-day levels.    
                                                            
16   http://www.latimes.com/business/la‐fi‐petruno24‐2008may24,1,6762856.column.    
17   We should note that the elasticity coefficient on futures price for each equation is the second largest 
(after supply) in the two, three, and four months model (Table III). 
Conclusion         
 We have found that for model specifications that include shorter-term futures contracts, 
supply does indeed dominate price movements in the crude oil market.  However, for longer-
term contracts, the real price of oil appears to be determined principally by the futures price.    
In order for the relationship between futures prices and the market price of oil outlined 
above to be valid, two associations would have to exist: futures prices and inventories would 
have to be positively cointegrated and supply and inventories would have to be inversely 
cointegrated.  As mentioned previously, the only way futures prices/speculation can increase oil 
prices is through hoarding which would increase inventories and remove oil from the market.  
There is empirical evidence of hoarding in the crude oil market.  The estimation results of the 
following equations may be found in Tables IV and V, 
13 
 
t t 1 2 6 3 4
1 2
,
,
t t t
t t t
STOCKS FPOIL DOIL SOIL
SOIL STOCKS
γ γ γ γ
ϕ ϕ τ
= + + + +
= + +
ξ
    (6) 
where the variable is U.S. stocks of crude oil excluding the Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve.  It is important to note that the six months futures price is positively and significantly 
related to inventories with an elasticity coefficient of .135 and oil stocks are inversely and 
significantly related to market supply with a coefficient of 3.82.  Thus, a ten percent increase in 
the six month futures price is associated with 1.35 percent increase in inventories which is in turn 
associated with a decrease in oil supplies of 5.16 percent.  While this may not appear to be a 
large percentage, consider that fact that in January 2004 the six months futures contract 
settlement price for WTI/Light Crude was $176.45 per barrel and in January 2008 it was $512.09 
per barrel--a 190 percent increase.   In addition to the above empirical analysis, it is possible to 
discern graphically from Figure 3 that there was a slight increase in oil inventories with a 
tSTOCKS
14 
 
concomitant “leveling-off” of supply after 2005—indicating that perhaps some of the more 
current precipitous oil price increases are indeed due to speculation (shaded yellow area in 
Figure 3).  
[ Insert Table IV Here ] 
[ Insert Table V Here ] 
[ Insert Figure 3 Here ]     
 From a policy perspective and given the current Congressional Hearings on the role of 
speculation in rising oil prices, the results of this analysis indicate that if regulators really wanted 
to limit speculation in the oil market, it could keep the shorter-term futures contracts and 
eliminate the inherently more speculative six months futures contracts.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
References 
Elliott, Graham, Thomas J. Rothenberg and James H. Stock (1996). Efficient Tests for an 
Autoregressive Unit Root, Econometrica, 64, pp. 813-836.  
Enders, Walter (2004).  Applied Econometric Time Series, Second Edition, John Wiley and 
Sons, Inc.: New York, NY. 
 
Engle, Robert E., and Clive W.J. Granger (1987).  Cointegration and Error-Correction: 
Representation, Estimation, and Testing, Econometrica, 55, March, pp. 251-276. 
 
Johansen, Soren (1988).  Statistical Analysis of Cointegration Vectors, Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, 12, June-September, pp. 231-254. 
 
Krugman, Paul (2008).  The Oil Nonbubble, The New York Times Opinion, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/12/opinion/12krugman.html?_r=2&th&emc=th&oref=sl&oref
=slogin.  
 
Sims, Christopher (1980).  Macroeconomics and Reality, Econometrica, 48, January, pp. 161-
200. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix I 
 
Variable Descriptions 
 
(All Variables Downloaded from http://www.haverselect.com) 
 
 
tPOIL  - Crude Oil Spot Price at Cushing, Oklahoma ($/bbl) (adjusted for inflation using the 
Personal Consumption Expenditure Chain Price Index) 
 
itFPOIL
2,3i =
 - Two, Three, Four, and Six Months Futures Price of Light, Sweet Crude Oil ($/bbl) 
( ) ,4,6
 
tEX  - Real Trade Weighted Exchange Value of Dollar versus Major Currencies (March 73 = 
100) 
 
tWELLS  - Total Oil from New U.S. Wells (DOE) 
 
tDOIL  - World Oil Demand (Mil. b/d) 
 
tSOIL  - World Oil Supply (Mil. b/d) 
 
tIRAQ  - a Dummy Variable Indicating the Time Periods of the Gulf War and the Iraq War 
(August 1990 - February 1991, March 2003 - ) 
 
tSTOCKS  - Total U.S. Stocks of Crude Oil (000 BBL, DOE) 
16 
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Table I 
Unit Root Tests 
 
Dickey-Fuller Tests with GLS Detrending 
 
 
Variable        0 : Series has a Unit RootH
            t Statistic 
 
tPOIL  - Crude Oil Spot Price at Cushing, Oklahoma  
(adjusted for inflation using the Personal Consumption  
Expenditure Chain Price Index)     -1.015  
 
itFPOIL  - Two, Three, Four, and Six Months  
Futures Price of Light, Sweet Crude Oil ( 2,3,4,6i = )  -.492, -.618, -.242, -.312 
 
tEX  - Real Trade Weighted Exchange Value of Dollar   -.899 
versus Major Currencies 
 
tWELLS  - Total Oil from New U.S. Wells    -1.555 
 
tDOIL  - World Oil Demand      -2.110 
 
tSOIL  - World Oil Supply      -2.170 
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Table II 
 
Johansen Cointegration Tests 
 
Maximum Eigenvalue Test 
21 
 
1
0 : ( )
: ( )
i
A i
H Rank r
H Rank r
π
π
=
= +  
 
1.  Model using two months contract futures price: 
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 5 Percent 1 Percent 
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value 
None **  0.199033  53.48658  45.28  51.57 
At most 1 *  0.170095  44.93289  39.37  45.10 
At most 2 **  0.150309  39.25458  33.46  38.77 
At most 3  0.091173  23.03964  27.07  32.24 
At most 4  0.062096  15.45000  20.97  25.52 
At most 5  0.021932  5.344337  14.07  18.63 
At most 6  0.000600  0.144706   3.76   6.65 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 3 cointegrating equation(s) at the 5% level 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at the 1% level 
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level 
 
2.  Model using three months contract futures price: 
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 5 Percent 1 Percent 
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Critical Value
None **  0.208862  56.69632  45.28  51.57 
At most 1 *  0.157357  41.43334  39.37  45.10 
At most 2  0.116121  29.87119  33.46  38.77 
At most 3  0.079595  20.07181  27.07  32.24 
At most 4  0.048214  11.95842  20.97  25.52 
At most 5  0.024076  5.897672  14.07  18.63 
At most 6  6.38E-05  0.015439   3.76   6.65 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating equation(s) at the 5% level 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at the 1% level 
 *(**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5%(1%) level 
 
3.  Model using four months contract futures price: 
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None *  0.213405  58.09017  46.23142  0.0018 
At most 1  0.151167  39.66196  40.07757  0.0556 
At most 2  0.118609  30.55358  33.87687  0.1185 
At most 3  0.084249  21.29855  27.58434  0.2586 
At most 4  0.046635  11.55736  21.13162  0.5917 
At most 5  0.024469  5.995163  14.26460  0.6138 
At most 6  4.76E-06  0.001152  3.841466  0.9723 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
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Table II (Continued) 
 
Johansen Cointegration Tests 
 
Maximum Eigenvalue Test 
π
π
=
= +  
 
4.  Model using six months contract futures price: 
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None *  0.205918  55.79766  46.23142  0.0036 
At most 1  0.142071  37.08252  40.07757  0.1047 
At most 2  0.117888  30.35563  33.87687  0.1244 
At most 3  0.085598  21.65541  27.58434  0.2386 
At most 4  0.047838  11.86289  21.13162  0.5613 
At most 5  0.024614  6.031163  14.26460  0.6092 
At most 6  3.05E-05  0.007375  3.841466  0.9311 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
   
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table III 
 
Cointegration Estimation Results 
 
 
  Estimated Coefficients (t Statistics Below in Parenthesis) 
Variable Two-Months  Three Months  Four Months  Six Months 
 
tPOIL   1   1   1   1 
 
itFPOIL  .920   1.10   1.186   1.565 
  (30.84)**  (24.27)**  (19.475)**  (12.596)** 
 
tEX   .070   -.182   -.240   -.430 
  (1.28)   (-2.06)*  (-1.994)*  (-1.718) 
 
tWELLS  -.084   .020   -.012   -.152 
  (-3.83)**  (.567)   (-.254)   (-1.582) 
 
tDOIL   1.97   .129   .405   3.128 
  (4.06)**  (.165)   (.378)   (1.391) 
 
tSOIL   -3.18   -2.094   -1.916   -.596 
  (-7.32)**  (-2.992)**  (-1.999)*  (-.298) 
  
tIRAQ   .035   -.008   .043   .199 
  (1.54)   (-.233)   (.889)   (1.962)* 
 
Intercept 4.65   7.246   8.459   13.386 
 
 
*   - statistically significant at .05α =  
** - statistically significant at .01α =  
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Table IV 
 
Cointegration and VEC Estimation Results 
 
Six Months Futures Price and U.S. Inventories 
 
 
1.  Johanson Cointegration Test: 
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None *  0.105006  29.50957  27.58434  0.0280 
At most 1  0.052065  14.22294  21.13162  0.3470 
At most 2  0.022287  5.995269  14.26460  0.6138 
At most 3  0.000175  0.046592  3.841466  0.8291 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 
 
2.  Estimated Cointegration Vector:   
Variable Estimated Coefficients (t Statistics Below in Parenthesis)     
 
tSTOCKS  1 
 
6tFPOIL  .135 
  (3.696)** 
 
tDOIL   -2.980 
  (-2.625)** 
 
tSOIL   1.886 
  (1.880) 
 
 
** - statistically significant at .01α =  
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Table V 
 
Cointegration and VEC Estimation Results 
 
Supply and U.S. Oil Inventories 
 
 
1.  Johanson Cointegration Test: 
Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
None *  0.173906  52.72903  15.89210  0.0000 
At most 1  0.023577  6.585256  9.164546  0.1501 
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 
 
2.  Estimated Cointegration Vector: 
Variable Estimated Coefficients (t Statistics Below in Parenthesis)     
 
tSOIL   1 
 
tSTOCKS  -3.820 
  (-3.259)** 
 
 
** - statistically significant at .01α =  
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